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Politics, development and the instrumentalization of  
(de) centralization in Sierra Leone 
 
Abstract 
 
The politics of decentralization reforms in Sierra Leone are both unpredictable and 
instructive.  This article based on fieldwork and secondary data, analyses party politics 
within the context of decentralization, arguing that the imperatives of post-war 
decentralization are not necessarily embedded in technical considerations, but in 
processes of political compromise and accommodation. Decentralization has helped 
facilitate the re-emergence of the old political order, in that the country’s main political 
parties have secured a consensus through which they have reconfigured the post-war 
state. This framing is useful in understanding the political economy in which fragility and 
political compromise continue to co-exist.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Sierra Leone has received a great deal of attention for a variety of reasons, including its 
notorious civil war of the 1990s. Since the end of the war, it has gone through a series of 
governance reforms, including a programme of decentralization which sought to 
restructure the governance of the state. With over a decade of the programme’s 
implementation, a number of studies have analysed the country’s decentralization 
programme, focusing mainly on the technical issues relating to the ability of local councils 
to deliver services (see for example Edwards et al. 2015: Fanthorpe et al. 2011). While 
some have attempted to analyse the politics of decentralization more broadly (see for 
example Jackson 2005; Srivastava and Larizza 2011), the interplay of party politics within 
the context of decentralization has not received much attention even though it has been 
important in shaping the current decentralization programme.  
 
This article is intended to contribute to narrowing the gap between the technical and 
political decentralization literature on Sierra Leone, highlighting the role party politics 
play in shaping decentralization’s outcome. It argues that decentralization has helped to 
facilitate the reemergence of the old political order, in that the country’s two main political 
parties, the All Peoples’ Congress (APC) and Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP), have 
been able to secure a consensus through which they have reconfigured the post-war state 
on their own terms. The imperatives of post-war decentralization reforms and other 
channels of local development are not necessarily embedded in technical considerations, 
but in processes of political compromise and accommodation within the political class. 
Decentralization has thus accentuated a longstanding feature of Sierra Leone’s patrimonial 
politics, in which kinship and informal networks have always shaped the configuration of 
the political class (Kilson 1966; Cartwright 1978). These analyses are useful in 
understanding the political economy in which fragility and political compromise continue 
to co-exist, which though illiberal, continue to sustain the peace even if temporarily.  
 
In order to analyse the interaction of party politics within the decentralization programme, 
the article relies on a set of interviews with former and current central and local 
government officials. Active research was based on fieldwork undertaken in Sierra Leone 
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from August 2011 to May 2012, with intermittent fieldwork carried out between June 2014 
and March 2016. A review of secondary data was also undertaken to illuminate some 
important political events. The article is structured in the following order: first, is the 
contextual framework, discussing the imperatives of decentralization in the developing 
world. In the second section, the article analyses the extent to which decentralization has 
served to provide a basis for compromise and accommodation within the political class. In 
the third section, the article analyses local elections, as well as the dynamics underpinning 
central-local political mobility, and the use of decentralization as a party consolidation 
strategy. The fourth section analyses ongoing attempts by the centre to hybridize reforms 
and recentralize power, while the fifth concludes the article. 
 
The context 
 
Decentralization is a governance policy on which political ideologies easily converge 
(Treisman, 2007). Its appeal rests on the fact that, a decentralized state can be efficient in 
planning and delivery of public services, as it matches citizens’ preferences with service 
provision (Manor, 1999; World Bank, 1988; Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983). In addition, 
decentralization ensures flexibility in planning and implementation of development 
projects, providing basis for effective coordination of different development agencies 
operating at the sub-national level (Conyers, 2006). It also improves governments’ 
responsiveness to local needs in the delivery of public services, thus contributing“...to the 
attainment of the trinity of good governance, development and poverty reduction” 
(Chinsinga, 2008:73). 
 
Whereas decentralization has become a very popular governance policy, governments are 
adopting it for a variety of reasons, some of which are only realised after the policy has 
been implemented (Manor, 1999; Treisman, 2007). Although decentralization policies 
usually state governments’ aspirations to improve citizens’ participation in governance and 
enhance the delivery of public goods, often the reasons underwriting them rest in the 
political class’ rationalisation of the policy’s political and economic benefits (Eaton et al, 
2010; Boone, 2003; O’Neil, 2003). In some countries, the decision to decentralize has been 
influenced by the desire to take advantage of the financial largess of Western donors 
(Treisman, 2007; Romeo, 2003). As Muhumuza (2008: 63) has argued, in Africa leaders 
have learned to adjust themselves to the dwindling resources at their disposal, accepting 
“... decentralization in particular, not because they were convinced about the need for 
fundamental change, but for purposes of economic and political survival”.  
 
A less economic narrative focuses on the political imperatives for decentralization. Indeed, 
as Ndegwa and Levy (2003) have argued, much of the technical literature often disregards 
the centrality of politics, although the design, implementation and outcomes of 
decentralization reforms are deeply political. Boone (2003: 360) has argued that, 
decentralization in Francophone West Africa has been the result of a political deal making 
process between central elites and local power brokers. In the case of the latest wave of 
decentralization reforms in Latin America, O’Neil (2003) has suggested that the arguments 
of deepening democracy and improving government efficiency, do not sufficiently explain 
the reasons behind such reforms. The instrumental nature of decentralization in the region 
suggests that governing political parties having “low expectations about their abilities to 
control power at the centre, and stable support over time may reconfigure the electoral 
system to take advantage of their strengths” (O’Neil, 2003: 1069).  
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In South Africa, decentralization became a key issue in constitutional discussions, as the 
country moved towards multiparty majority rule, given that minority parties whose support 
were concentrated in particular provinces, feared the widespread support of the African 
National Congress  (Eaton et al. 2010). In addition, Olivier de Sardan (2009) has argued 
that, in many West Africa countries where political parties are financially and structurally 
weak, no policy or programme entrenches them in the interior of a country more than 
decentralization. These arguments therefore portray decentralization as a politically 
instrumental strategy, rather than a normative and technical concept, as most countries’ 
decentralization policies suggest. It is within this context that the argument of this article is 
situated.  
 
Political compromise, accommodation and decentralization 
 
The phenomenon of political compromise and accommodation is not new in Sierra 
Leonean politics. The country’s political class has always been shaped by networks linking 
its members through ties such as kinship and chieftaincy (Barrows 1976; Tangri1980: 188). 
As Tangri (1978: 167) has argued, “…parties have been weak and febrile bodies not 
possessing much…at the local level. They therefore concluded alliances with 
factions…which they hoped would assist them to overcome these weaknesses”. For 
instance, before independence central-local relations were such that:  
 
From 1957 with SLPP leaders holding most ministerial posts, the position of chiefs was 
secured. So long as Paramount Chiefs pledged support for and rendered political assistance 
to the ruling party, then the SLPP government proved unresponsive to moves to unseat 
chiefs from office (Tangri1980: 188).  
 
The relationship between SLPP politicians and chiefs was thus reciprocal, and the latter 
were very instrumental in determining the leadership of the party in its formative years, 
given their close ties to the country’s first Prime Minister, Sir Milton Margai (Cartwright 
1978; Kilson 1966). In the 1970s and the period leading to the civil war, although chiefs 
remained politically important, a relatively new form of elite alignment and 
accommodation emerged in the form of cultural associations such as the “Ekutay”, “…a 
northern ethnic cabal, which became a major source of patronage” (Zack-Williams 
2012:19).   
 
With the advent of the war and the overthrow of the APC in 1992, the ability of the 
“Ekutay” and other simmering ethnic based political networks to be self-sustaining proved 
weak, as they were either destroyed, or made redundant. The impacts of Sierra Leone’s 
civil war were so destructive that by the time it ended, the country was among “weak and 
failing states”, and the international community “ended up literally taking over the 
governance function from local actors” (Fukuyama, 2004:125). Fukuyama’s analysis of 
the immediate post-war period highlights the extent to which the agency of local political 
actors was eroded, and what needed to be done to re-establish their leverage. In the 
intervening years, the situation changed rapidly, as the political class reconstructed the 
post-war state on the basis of political party accommodation and compromises, which have 
ensured that whether in opposition or in government, the country’s two largest political 
parties – the APC and SLPP have been part of the governance of the state, even if such 
compromises have been unobvious, unintended and tenuous.  
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The “National Strategy for Good Governance” produced by the SLPP Government in 
1997, a year after its election, laid the foundation for the political compromise, as it 
strongly highlighted the need to share power through decentralization (Government of 
Sierra Leone, 1997: 38) The document noted that:   
 
Government’s determination to re-activate local Government is a manifestation of its 
acceptance of the fact that, the survival of a democratic government, depends upon the 
revival of democratic participatory institutions such as the various local authorities that 
exist by law in the country... (Government of Sierra Leone, 1997: 38)  
  
However, given the escalation of the war in the late 1990s, meaningful discussions on 
decentralization were not to recommence until 2003. The results and follow-on actions 
emanating from nationwide consultations on the design of decentralization in that year, 
point to the ritualistic nature of consultation, and the persistent determination of the 
political class to subvert citizens’ preferences in furtherance of its own goals. In particular, 
whereas the consultations revealed a preference for non-partisan local council elections 
(Fanthorpe 2005; Conteh 2014a) given the public’s mistrust of career politicians,  
Fanthorpe (2005) has argued that “…The SLPP-led government rejected this demand, 
claiming, somewhat unconvincingly given its overwhelming parliamentary majority, that 
opposition parties had forced its hand”. 
 
This assertion by the SLPP, contradicts the reality of proceedings in Sierra Leone’s 
parliament. Given that the ruling party can almost always have its way in major decisions 
no matter the basis of the protestations of the opposition, the claim of the SLPP that the 
opposition had forced its hand is improbable and unconvincing. Generally, the weakness 
of the opposition in influencing legislations has left its members of parliament with the 
only option of “walking out of parliament” when they feel their voices have not been heard 
(Awareness Times, 3 December, 2013; Politico, 3 December, 2013). What then explains 
the political class’ preference for partisan elections? A former SLPP Vice President has 
argued that political compromise and accommodation were major considerations, as:  
 
There were some in the party who felt that given our majority in parliament, if we had 
gone for non-partisan elections, we would have dominated even traditional bases of the 
APC, by getting our supporters elected to the councils. But given President Kabbah’s 
bipartisan approach to important national issues, he wanted to accommodate the concerns 
of the opposition. That was why he persuaded SLPP members of parliament not to support 
the idea (Interview, former Vice President, Bo, February 20, 2016). 
 
While Kabbah succeeded in getting SLPP parliamentarians not to support non-partisan 
elections provisions in the local government bill of 2003, the APC ironically used a legal 
argument to make their case for partisan elections, even if it was a subterfuge. The party 
argued that the 1991 constitution made no provision for non-partisan elections, noting that 
it represented a breach of the country’s fundamental law (Interview, former Whip APC, 
Freetown, November 24, 2011; Former Minister of Local Government and Rural 
Development, Freetown, August 27, 2011). However, on the balance of evidence, the 
APC’s constitutional posture suggests a smokescreen concealing the party’s actual 
preference for partisan elections.  For a party that was the second largest in parliament, but 
with limited chances of forming the government at the time, partisan elections became the 
only means through which it could gain political power and resources while in opposition, 
even if at the local level (Former Minister of Local Government and Rural Development, 
Freetown, August 27, 2011).  
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The party had therefore argued that the only way political parties could gauge the 
country’s “political temperature”, was by ensuring that elections to councils were 
contested along party lines (Interview, former Whip APC, Freetown, November, 24, 2011; 
Interview, Senior District Officer, Port Loko District, June 6, 2014). Indeed, the argument 
of local council elections serving as a political barometer was first given credence in the 
2004 local council elections, when the APC won the two councils in the Western Area, and 
majority in the North. The party’s victories “...served as an early warning that the SLPP 
was rapidly losing support in the Western Area” (Kandeh, 2012:109). The winning trend 
of the party was further reinforced by the results of the 2007 presidential and 
parliamentary elections, when it finally took over power from the SLPP, leaving the latter 
to contend with the nine local councils it controls in the south and east of the country. 
 
With over a decade since the conduct of the first post-war local council elections, the 
positions of the two parties on the basis of elections to local councils have not changed, 
underlining the politically instrumental control which partisan elections offer them. At the 
time of writing, a committee charged with reviewing the country’s 1991 constitution, 
recommended that local council elections be non-partisan (Constitutional Review 
Committee 2016), echoing views expressed by the public in 2003, but to which the APC 
and SLPP have remained opposed (Interview, Chairman, Pujehun District Council, 
Freetown, March 5, 2016; Interview, Constitutional Review Committee member, 
Freetown, February 17, 2016). Given the dynamics of the country’s bipartisan parliament, 
few have doubts that the non-partisan election recommendation will be rejected by 
parliamentarians, reinforcing their strong sense of group solidarity against existential and 
material threats (Interview, Constitutional Review Committee member, Freetown, 
February 17, 2016).  Underlining the parties’ rejection of nonpartisan elections, is the fear 
of losing control over local councils, thus limiting their ability to obtain and redistribute 
patronage, as well as determining the outcomes of local politics, which are closely linked 
with national political processes. 
 
In many ways, the basis of the political compromises and accommodation that have 
underpinned the country’s decentralization programme, through which the APC and SLPP 
have ensured their survival whether in government or in opposition, has been facilitated by 
the country’s ethno-regional voting patterns, which have persisted since the 1960s (Conteh 
and Harris 2014; Kandeh, 1992). In the 2012 local council elections which were conducted 
concurrently with the presidential and parliamentary elections, the APC won all the 
councils in the West Area, Northern Region and Kono District, giving it a total of 10 
councils, while the SLPP won nine councils, all of them in the South-Eastern Region. Of 
the 456 councillors in the country’s 19 councils, the APC has 253, while the SLPP has 
198; the People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC), an offshoot of the SLPP 
has one councillor, while independents make up the remaining four (National Electoral 
Commission, 2012). The split in the number of councils and councillors among the parties 
indicates a sharp regional divide in voter preferences, as well as the difficulties of minority 
and independent candidates in gaining traction among voters, no matter their political 
qualifications and programmes.  
 
The almost even distribution of the number of local councils controlled by the APC and 
SLPP has ensured that decentralized resources are horizontally spread across the 19 local 
councils, given the relatively transparent intergovernmental transfer formula established by 
the Local Government Finance Department in the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
6 
 
Development (Kargbo 2009). However, there have been claims by opposition controlled 
councils of unfair treatment by the central government, over extra support outside the 
statutory intergovernmental transfers (Conteh 2014a); as well as suspicions that the 
government would like to see opposition councils fail, by not strengthening and 
empowering them (Fanthorpe et al 2011). A frequently cited example is the amount of 
kilometres of roads allocated to the northern city of Makeni and other district head quarter 
towns in the north, under the central government’s roads construction and rehabilitation 
programme, compared with those in the south and east of the country. As one local council 
deputy chairman in the east of the country noted: 
 
There is widespread perception among local council leaders in the south and east that the 
APC is treating our districts and cities unfairly. Look at the amount of roads that are being 
done in Makeni and the speed with which they are being constructed. You will notice that 
it is different from what is happening here in Kenema…look at the worsening conditions 
of our roads (Interview, Deputy Chairman, Kenema District Council, Kenema, February 
24, 2016).  
 
Whereas such claims of central government bias are rejected by local council leaders in the 
north, regarding them as baseless, a nuanced analysis of how extra resources are allocated 
to local councils whether in government or opposition controlled areas is needed to 
disentangle such claims. Councils in opposition controlled areas have also sometimes 
disproportionately benefited from the roads programme, and as one Chairman of an 
opposition controlled District Council in the South has noted: 
 
The ability of a chairman to attract resources from the central government to a council is 
not always determined by whether he is SLPP or APC. It sometimes depends on their 
ability to lobby the government. For example, my district was supposed to have five 
kilometres of road, but as I speak, they are going to do about 20, because I lobbied the 
government for my people. In fact it is hypocritical for some chairmen to accuse the APC 
of favouring the north given that they do the same thing when allocating development 
projects in their districts. They favour their home towns or villages. For me I have a 
number of advantages, including the fact that my father-in-law is a strong member of the 
APC (Interview, Chairman of a Southern Region District Council, Freetown, March 5, 
2016). 
 
The chairman’s comments are instructive, providing some basis for understanding how the 
politics of decentralization have played out in the country, as well as somewhat 
counteracting the dominant narrative in the contemporary literature of a country whose 
political parties have contributed to building political walls between its people, regions and 
political class. Indeed, in some instances party allegiance is of little importance for 
councils when dealing with the central government. Evidence points to the importance of 
informal and formal networks such as being an alumnus of the country’s leading schools 
and universities, as well as other ties within the political class. For instance, the first post-
war SLPP Mayor of Bo City, Wusu Sannoh had friends in “high places” who contributed 
to making his tenure successful, even if they were in the APC. Sannoh and the former 
Minister of Local Government and Rural Development were contemporaries at the 
University of Sierra Leone in the 1970s, a fact that made it easier for him to relate to the 
ministry, at least at the policy level (Interview, Mayor of Bo City, Bo, September 5, 2011). 
Twice during his second term, he succeeded in rejecting transfers of the council’s 
Environmental Health Officer and Chief Administrator to other councils by the Local 
Government Service Commission, something which other local council leaders were 
unable to do, even when they were dissatisfied (Interview, Commonwealth Governance 
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Advisor, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Freetown, March 16, 
2012).  
 
Thus, although political allegiance is important in getting access to power through local 
elections which are relatively less contested than national elections (Conteh 2014a), group 
solidarity within the political class becomes the prerequisite for success and continued 
accommodation. Sannoh’s dealings with the government, can be contrasted with the 
treatment of the APC Mayor of Koidu City, Saa Emerson Lamina, who was suspended on 
allegations of financial impropriety in early 2016 by the Minister of Local Government 
and Rural Development (Awareness Times, March 2, 2016). While the case against 
Lamina appeared compelling (Awareness Time, February 29, 2016), it has been suggested 
that the vigorous reaction of the Minister to suspend him was not only influenced by the 
need for accountability, given the high levels of corruption in councils (Conteh 2014a; 
Workman 2011). As one newspaper has suggested:  
 
the suspension of the mayor could not be unconnected to the “deep rooted malice” the 
minister had developed for Lamina since he took office in 2012, after he (Mayor Lamina) 
showed his allegiance to the now sacked Vice President Sam Sumana (Politico, March 1, 
2016).  
 
The case of the suspended Mayor does not only highlight the nexus between local and 
national politics, and how both influence each other, it also illustrates how the political 
class can be malevolent towards it members who fall out of favour, even within the same 
political party. The Mayor had been a longstanding supporter of the sacked Vice President, 
who was controversially removed from office in 2015, following the breakdown of his 
relationship with the President (BBC News, March 18, 2015). On the other hand, the 
Minister of Local Government and Rural Development had a bitter feud with the former 
Vice President, although all of them hailed from Kono District. As the Politico Newspaper 
pointed out:  
 
It is not a hidden secret that VP Sumana and Diana Konomanyi do not see eye-to-eye and 
this division between them has cost the district a lot. What we see now are insecurity, 
underdevelopment, and youth violence (Politico, July 8, 2014). 
 
Underlining the tensions between the two central government officials which were 
sometimes violently played out both at the national and local levels of politics (Politico, 
July 8, 2014), is the general quest of national politicians to ensure that they bring local 
political actors under their personal control, key operatives in mobilizing votes, as well as 
facilitators of national political actors’ mobility. Thus tensions between central 
government officials emanating from their determination to control local politics are by no 
means exclusive to the two politicians and the APC. In fact the opposition SLPP has 
experienced its own share of the destructive effects of the merging of local and national 
politics, as it continues to undergo a struggle among different factions of the party that 
want to influence the outcomes of the elections for the party’s presidential candidate in  
elections scheduled for 2018. Given the strategic role of local politicians in mobilizing 
votes, different aspirants have been courting them with varying degrees of success, in the 
process further dividing the party’s local structures (Interview, Chairman, Pujehun District 
Council, Freetown, March 5, 2016).  
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Local elections, political mobility and party consolidation 
 
The technical literature on political decentralization often highlights the need for the 
process to engender meaningful civic participation, increased human and material 
resources for local government. In addition, it stresses the need for a system through which 
locally elected officials are held accountable by local electorates for their actions (Kauzya, 
2007; Smoke, 2003). Therefore, the implications for countries emerging from prolonged 
periods of centralization and exclusionary politics, is a radical shift from elite dominance 
to local empowerment, which is not always guaranteed through elections, however regular. 
While Sierra Leone held its first multi-party elections in the post-military rule era in 1996, 
the country’s elections continue to be characterised by a number of electoral rituals 
including fraud, vote buying, violence and elite protection (Conteh and Harris, 2014) some 
of which have cast shadows over the conduct of local council elections. The first post-war 
local council elections were conducted in 2004, with wards serving as electoral 
boundaries, making the competition for party symbols very competitive. However, the 
centralised management of party structures  meant that leaders of the APC and SLPP were 
able to redeploy to local councils, some of the “surplus political elite”, who had made 
failed bids to become members of parliament and ministers (Interview, Chairman Bombali 
District Council, Makeni, September 13, 2011). Therefore, to some degrees, parties’ 
headquarters “dictated” local candidates, while preventing capable and popular ones from 
contesting (Zhou and Zhang, 2009: 86). 
   
The dominance of political party hierarchies, especially in the APC and SLPP in deciding 
candidates, is reflected in the words of a former APC district council chairman in the 
North, who noted that “in local, as in national elections, the electorate is not important in 
deciding who runs for elections. It is the ‘selectorate’ that matters” (Interview, with 
Chairman Bombali District Council, Makeni 13 September 13, 2011). By “selectorate” he 
meant a select group of party leaders who award party symbols to candidates, not 
necessarily on the basis of merit, but often on considerations of kin, friendship and 
financial contributions. This scenario indicates that certain political processes normally put 
in place by political parties to encourage popular participation, are basically symbolic and 
used by powerful politicians to create a semblance of inclusivity and empowerment.  
Although in the 2008 and 2012 local council elections some parties embarked on a 
symbolic participatory process in conducting primary elections for candidates at the ward 
level, the final decisions were made in Freetown (Conteh, 2014a). In what was not a rare 
instance in 2008, Overbeek (2008) has noted that one aspirant was reported to have paid 
the equivalent of US $ 700 in a bid to obtain a party symbol. 
 
Regardless of the challenges in deepening local democratic competition, generally 
elections to local councils are seen as key steps to national political careers, as councils are 
regarded as political training grounds (Interview, Chairman Moyamba District Council, 
Bo, February 23, 2016; Interview, Deputy Chairman, Kenema District Council, Kenema, 
February 24, 2016). Although in the post-war era political mobility has been witnessed in 
both downward and upward directions, the results have been mixed, and the circumstances 
that lead to mobility range from one’s personality, ability to mobilize votes, as well as 
complex political deal making processes. The case of the former Chairman of the SLPP 
John Benjamin, is illuminating and provides an example of how political actors can 
transition from the centre to the local, and then to the centre. Benjamin served as Secretary 
General of the NPRC (Harris 2013), but remained inactive in national politics in the years 
following the democratic transition in 1996. He was however elected Chairman of the 
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Kailahun District Council in 2004, and became Minister of Finance a year later (Harris 
2013), after he withdrew his support for John B. Duada the then Minister of Finance, in 
favour of Solomon Berewa the Vice President at the time, in a keenly contested 
Presidential candidate election (Interview, Chairman Moyamba District Council, Bo, 
February 23, 2016). Benjamin went on to become Chairman and Leader of the SLPP in 
2009, and in 2013 he declared his intention of contesting the Presidential candidate 
elections of the party for the 2018 Presidential elections (Awoko, August 15, 2013).  
 
In addition to Benjamin, there have been other local council actors who have moved to 
prominent positions in the national government or party structures, thus linking local and 
national politics. For example, the Minister of Local Government was Chairperson of the 
Kono District Council, and at the time of writing, was Chairperson of the APC, Kono 
District. In Pujehun District, “two, out of five Members of Parliament were local 
councillors”; and even where they have not succeeded in going to parliament, “…they 
have played important roles in shaping politics by becoming party functionaries especially 
at the constituency level, where many of them are either chairmen or secretaries” 
(Interview, Chairman, Pujehun District Council, Freetown, March 5, 2016). However, a 
successful stint as leader of a council is not always a guarantee for success at the national 
level, as the dynamics underpinning such transitions can be complex and frustrating. As 
Wusu Sannoh the former Mayor of Bo found out when he contested the positions of Vice 
Chairman and Leader of the SLPP, a candidate’s appeal for success should transcend local 
political boundaries, in political processes that do not always use competence and track 
records as basis for rewarding political actors. The controversial manner in which the 
elections were conducted forced him to withdraw from the race, even before the votes 
were cast (Awoko, August 19, 2013).  
 
Despite the difficulty faced by some former local council leaders such as Sannoh, to break 
through onto the national stage of politics, there has been a merging of local and national 
politics, made possible by the decentralization programme; and the APC and SLPP have 
generally used decentralization to strengthen their party structures in ways that pre-war 
state configuration did not allow them. The lack of recognised and guaranteed funding 
sources for political parties in Sierra Leone, has given rise to “elections only parties” 
(Conteh and Harris 2014), with some surviving only on the goodwill of their founders, 
periodic donations and sometimes acting as fronts for the ruling party (Awoko, June 2, 
2014; Awareness Times, January 16, 2014; Conteh and Harris, 2014).  Nonetheless, for the 
APC and SLPP, they have been able to sustain their party structures through their control 
of the 19 local councils. The fact that party hierarchies decide who becomes a councillor 
ensures their loyalty in maintaining a local core of party organisers. Local councillors are 
by internal party arrangements, required to contribute part of their sitting allowances to 
their parties (Interviews, APC councillors, Port Loko, June 6, 2014; Interview, Deputy 
Chairman Kenema District Council, Kenema, February 24, 2016), funds used to keep party 
offices functional..  
 
In addition to the regular contributions by the councillors, local councils are sometimes 
requested to contribute to election campaigns by party headquarters, a practice that places 
additional strains on the meagre resources of councils that are barely struggling to provide 
the barest minimum of services (Interview, Chairman Moyamba District Council, Bo, 
February 23, 2016). The practice also highlights a major challenge of the decentralization 
programme in fostering accountability, as councils’ leaders are often faced with the 
dilemma of appeasing their patrons in Freetown who will have to determine their 
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candidacy in the next election, or their mobility, while trying to ensure the availability of 
resources for the delivery of services.  
    
The spectre of recentralization  
 
Despite the strengthening of local party structures through the use of decentralization by 
the APC and SLPP, the former first re-elected in 2007, has simultaneously demonstrated a 
determination to recentralize political control, as well as local development functions, 
indicating a limit to the extent the central political class can accommodate local actors. The 
reintroduction of decentralization in 2004 was accompanied by an abolition of the office of 
“the colonially-inherited post of District Officer” (DO) (Fanthorpe et al. 2011: 8; Jackson 
2005), a move that threatened the grip of the centre on the periphery. Before 2004, DOs 
supervised and coordinated the activities of chiefdoms in relation to the enforcement of 
law and order; presided over the election of chiefs (Fanthorpe et al. 2011), and in the one-
party era, they also served as Returning Officers in national elections (Interview, former 
Minister of Local Government and Rural Development, Freetown, August 27, 2011). 
Given these instrumental purposes which the DOs served, their abolition was only 
reluctantly accepted by certain influential members of the SLPP government. By 2007 
when the party lost power, “the need for a central government representative at the district 
level, to bridge the gap between chiefdom authorities and the government, had become 
increasingly urgent” (Interview, former Minister of Local Government and Rural 
Development, Freetown, August 27, 2011).  
 
In the view of the SLPP, the abolition of the DOs created a lacuna between the central 
government and chiefdom authorities that could neither be narrowed by the local councils, 
nor could they adjudicate in disputes between chiefs and their subjects. Although the need 
to address such gaps had existed before the APC took over government in 2007, it was not 
until 2010 that a concrete move was made to bring back the Dos. Their return was 
precipitated by an incident between the Vice President and a Chairman of an opposition 
controlled local council in the south of the country. The Vice President had gone on an 
official visit, but had not received the traditional hospitality reserved for his status. The 
chairman had insisted that, he was not under any obligation to meet the Vice President, nor 
provide him hospitality given that he was not informed of his visit (Interview, Chairman, 
Pujehun District Council, Freetown, March 5, 2016).   
 
The incident not only signalled the increasingly assertive posture of opposition controlled 
councils, but also openly challenged long held traditions of local government officials, 
demonstrating loyalty to important central government visitors. Thus, for the advisers of 
the local government minister, the government was losing control of the periphery, and the 
reaction was the reintroduction of the DOs, despite the protestations of the opposition 
(Awoko, September 9, 2010), civil society and donors (Interview, former minister of Local 
Government and Rural Development, Freetown, August 27, 2011). Thus in the post-war 
decentralization policy of 2010, the status of the local council was downgraded from that 
of “the highest political authority in the locality” (Government of Sierra Leone 2004:16), 
to “the highest development authority” (Government of Sierra Leone 2010).  
 
While the actions of the APC government in downgrading the status of local councils 
illustrates ongoing central-local tensions, it also raises a number of broader policy issues 
relating to the current and future trajectory of decentralization, the place and role of its 
proponents, including the donors.  One can understand the reintroduction of the DOs using 
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a number of perspectives. First, decentralization has become a victim of its own success 
(Fanthorpe et al. 2011). The argument is that, decentralization has become so successful 
that, the central government is nervous of its potential to undermine its hold on the 
periphery. On the other hand, the reintroduction of the DOs reflects donors’ waning 
influence on government’s policies and programmes, relative to the immediate post-wars 
years.  
 
Additional attempts by the APC to recentralize political power and community 
development functions have been shrouded in recent processes, which have received 
bipartisan support in parliament. The first relates to revisions in the Local Government Act 
of 2004, which will blur local and national lines of politics, as members of parliament will 
become members of Ward Development Committees, (WDC) (Interview, Policy and Legal 
Officer, Decentralization Secretariat, August 6, 2014). This is likely to worsen the 
fractured relations among the political elite, with a possibility of rendering moribund 
WDCs, completely ineffectual. Even under the existing arrangement, the relations between 
chiefs and local councillors in the WDC have been adversarial as both claim superiority 
over the other (Interview, Director of Local Government, Freetown, August 17, 2011). 
Thus, adding MPs to the WDC would make them spaces for permanent contestations, 
instead of development planning.  
 
The second process relates to the provision of constituency development fund (CDF) for 
parliamentarians (Politico, January 21, 2014; Cocorioko International, August 20, 2014), 
that had been made redundant even before the 1996 elections. Whilst the amount paid to 
MPs is negligible in relation to that controlled by local councils, the move has however 
raised eyebrows as to the actual motives of the government. Members of parliament have 
defended the initiative and sought to allay public fears by arguing that the CDF will 
complement the work of the councils, rather than displace them (Interview, Member of 
Parliament, Constituency 08, Freetown, July 9, 2014). This however has the potential to 
further complicate a local development space, in which local councils, NGOs, chiefs and 
other actors, have constantly challenged, rather than complement their work, often in an 
uncoordinated and dysfunctional fashion (Conteh 2014b). A study tour of MPs to Kenya to 
study how that country manages its CDF (Standard Digital, February 20, 2014; Kenya 
News Agency, February 20, 2014), perhaps exemplifies the confusion and lack of 
understanding on how to proceed with what local councils have described as a duplication 
(Interview, Chairman Local Council Association of Sierra Leone, Port Loko, July 31, 
2014). 
 
One consideration influencing the reintroduction of the CDF is that the representational 
role of MPs does not necessarily confer legitimacy, unlike their ability to directly provide 
tangible public goods for constituents. This is rooted in the pre-war role of MPs, when 
they were considered champions of community development. On the other hand, it is 
plausible for one to analyse the CDF within the context of an executive, that has always 
been willing to extend patronage to persons or groups it perceives as potential challengers, 
thus co-opting them (Conteh and Harris 2014). Indeed, the fact that the CDF has replaced 
the now defunct constituency facilitation fund (CFF), whose purpose was questioned given 
that it was paid into the personal accounts of MPs; and for which they never accounted 
(Sierra Express Media, April 14, 2014), illustrates that the change might only be a 
legitimation process, intended to assuage public concerns over the use of public funds 
allocated to MPs. Whatever is the rationale for the reintroduction of the CDF, it is likely to 
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undermine the community development function of local councils; intensify local actors’ 
conflict, and further solidify the centre’s grip on the periphery.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Decentralization, as we have seen, has not fundamentally changed Sierra Leonean politics. 
In fact it has led to the re-emergence of the old order, in that it has facilitated a form of 
political accommodation underlined by a compromise that has by and large stabilised the 
political class, with its functionality reflecting pre-war governance practices. This 
contradicts donors’ narrative on the rationale for democratic decentralization in Sierra 
Leone, which deemphasizes the imperatives of politics, portraying it as a governance 
reform and peace consolidation strategy implemented by the SLPP government, with the 
aim of addressing the causes of the war – “exclusion and deprivation of the rural masses”, 
as well as improving social services (Zhou 2009: xviii; Srivastava and Larizza 2011; 
Edwards et al. 2015).  
 
However, the extent to which the current political compromise and accommodation will 
sustain the peace in the long term is unclear, but will somewhat depend on the political 
class’ ability to extend to the general citizenry, that which it has secured for itself. 
Underwriting the ongoing accommodation and compromises in the post-war era, is the 
realization that the ruling political class’ interests and those of other actors, are not always 
mutually exclusive. Although in some ways post-war politics have been characterised by a 
“winner-takes-all” mentality, the APC and SLPP have been able to work out an unwritten, 
but workable political compromise, through which they have ensured that, at any given 
time, each party whether in government or in opposition, controls power even if only at the 
local level. The compromise has also helped them retain control over the periphery and 
local party structures, while guaranteeing local notables limited autonomy and patronage.  
 
The processes of accommodation and compromise are also important in understanding the 
dynamics that influence the production of some public goods across the country. Whilst 
the general public perception of regional development in opposition areas is one of central 
government bias against them, such claims do not always reflect the fuller picture of the 
undercurrents determining the spread of development projects. For example, the relatively 
“flexible management” of the roads programme, plausibly the result of the inapplicability 
of rules and regulations even where they exist, has made it possible for some districts in 
opposition controlled areas to disproportionately benefit from the programme. This is 
especially true in opposition districts where local leaders consider their interests intricately 
linked to that of the central government in what is a “win-win” strategy. Furthermore, 
inasmuch as party allegiances are important, a local leader’s success is often determined 
by many other factors, other than just party allegiances. Their ability to skilfully transcend 
party lines, and making use of previously established networks based on alumni 
relationships, as well as informal links such as intermarriages linking politicians across 
regions and parties all play important roles in ensuring success.   
   
Nonetheless, the manner in which the post-war state has been reconfigured, with the 
political class actively shaping its current form, continues to pose threats to the centre’s 
dominance, giving rise to the need to contain local councils. The APC’s reintroduction of 
the DOs is indicative of the centre’s unease with some assertive parts of the periphery 
regardless of their political allegiance, a situation that has given rise to the need to 
perpetuate a hybridised form of local governance. This partly explains the struggles among 
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central government politicians over the control of local politics, in processes of political 
competition that continue to reflect illiberal governance features often associated with 
elections and the use of state power, which ultimately undermine the development of a 
functional democratic culture. On the other hand, the manner in which the bipartisan 
parliament has been able to build consensus around the CDF, somewhat illustrates the 
homogeneity of its interests, and a more affable relationship within the political class, than 
the rather exaggerated political divide often suggested by commentators. The mutual 
interests of its members continue to shape the trajectory of (de) centralization, while 
overshadowing those of the citizenry, whose tolerance for politicians’ unaccountable 
behaviour, is yet to reach intolerable and unacceptable limits.  
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